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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GORDON CROFTS,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,
v.

Case No. 070501122

SAINT GEORGE CITY,
a municipal City,
Defendant/Appellee.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
This is an appeal of the rulings made by James L. Shumate in the case of the above
named parties. Lower Court case number 070501122.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue I:
Did the trial Court err by not applying an equitable remedy to allow Plaintiffs claim to be
heard when Plaintiff substantially complied with all notice requirements of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
" A trial Court's conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed for correctness and
therefore no deference is given to the trial Court's ruling on questions of law. See, State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). "Under prevailing standards of review, this Court may review both
1

the facts and the law of matters in equity . . . Nonetheless, we accord considerable deference to
the judgment of the trial Court and interpose our own judgment only where the evidence clearly
preponderates to the contrary or the trial Court abuses its discretion or misapplies principles of
law." Mineer v. Mineer, 706 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah, 1985).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Mr. Crofts was at the Sand Hollow Swimming Complex ("Complex") in Saint. George,
Utah on March 26th, 2005. (R.33 Memo in Opposition to Dismissal) Mr. Crofts entered the
Complex carrying his 14th month old son in his arms. (R. 33). When Mr. Crofts entered the
Complex he was standing on a landing and then proceeded to walk down a flight of stairs. (R.
33) As Mr. Crofts began to walk down the stairs he put one had on the hand rail and held his son
with the other hand. (R. 33) As Mr. Crofts stepped onto the first stair there was an accumulation
of water on the stair, causing his feet to slip out from under him. (R. 33) Mr. Crofts landed on
his left elbow and back, as he adjusted to protect his son from getting injured. (R.33)
As a result of his fall at the Complex Mr. Crofts sustained injuries to his elbow, neck, and
back. (R. 33). His injuries have caused pain in his elbow, persistent headaches, and back
spasms. (R. 33). By law Mr. Crofts had until March 26, 2006 to file a Notice of Claim against
the City of St. George in accordance with §63-30d-401 and 402 of the GIAU. (R. 33) However,
March 26, 2006 fell on a Sunday, therefore under the URCP Mr. Crofts had until Monday March
27, 2006 to file his Notice of Claim. (R.33) After the accident, Mr. Crofts immediately sought
treatment with a qualified physician. (R.33) During the statutory period Mr. Crofts' doctor
monitored his condition to see if he had permanent impairment due to the injuries sustained from
2

his accident at the Complex. (R. 33)
Mr. Crofts did not intend to file suit against the City of St. George unless and until he
knew he had sustained permanent injuries, and his condition would not improve. (R. 33) On
March 10, 2006, seventeen days before the Notice of Claim was due, Mr. Crofts' counsel of
record, Steven Wall, had delivered to the Constable in Salt Lake City a copy of the Notice of
Claim with instructions for service. (R. 33 letter to Constable). The Constable assured Mr. Wall
that the Notice of Claim would be delivered well before the March 27, deadline. (R. 29 Affidavit
of Constable). One week prior to the March 27 deadline Mr. Wall contacted the Constable to
make sure service had been effected. The Constable assured Mr. Wall service had, or would be
made before the deadline. ((R. 33). The Constable in St. George did not deliver the Notice of
Claim until March 28, 2007. (R. 29 Affidavit of Constable)
On May 21, 2007, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against Defendant, Saint George City with
the Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in Saint George, Utah (R.l). Plaintiff served the
Complaint on Defendant Saint George City on July 18, 2007 (R. 18). On August 7, 2007, the
Defendant filed their Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint (R. 12).
On August 9, 2007 the Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss because the service of
Notice of Claim was one day late (R. 21 Motion to Dismiss). On November 13, 2007 Mr. Crofts
filed a Motion for Enlargement of Time to file Notice of Claim. (R. 26.) A hearing on the issues
of dismissal and enlargement of time to serve notice was held on April 22, 2008. (R. 82 transcript
all pages) Both sides were present and Judge Shumate felt Mr. Crofts had an equitable claim but
saw no room under the current law to grant the motion for an enlargement of time. (R. 82
transcript pg 10-11). An Order of Dismissal was filed by Judge Shumate on May 15, 2008. (R.
3

71 Order of Dismissal). Mr. Crofts filed a notice of Appeal on June 11, 2008. (R. 75 Notice of
Appeal).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case presents only one issue to this Court. Should the trial Court have dismissed Mr.
Crofts' case because his Notice of Claim was delivered one day late because of circumstances
beyond his control? The City of Saint George will argue that Utah has a firm rule of strict
compliance with the UGIA. However, both Utah precedent and cases from other jurisdictions
support a rule of substantial compliance in cases where the Plaintiffs behavior shows strict
compliance with the requirements of the UGIA. If the Plaintiff has done everything reasonably
necessary to effect compliance, the end result should not be determinative, unless the State would
be prejudiced if the claim was allowed to proceed.
In this case, Mr. Crofts waited, while to file claim for his injuries occurring at a
swimming complex in Saint George, Utah until he was sure his injuries had caused lasting
damage. Mr. Crofts' attorney had the Notice of Claim delivered to a Constable for personal
service upon the City of Saint George seventeen days before the statutory deadline. Mr. Crofts'
attorney then followed up with the Constable to make sure the Notice would be delivered by the
deadline. The Constable failed to make a timely delivery. Hence, the reason for this legislation
is the City of Saint George evading a claim by mere technicality that does not harm their ability
to defend the case and was not the fault of the Plaintiff.
This Court should follow the precedent already set in Utah to lessen the strict compliance
standard when the actions of the Plaintiff show complete effort to meet the requirements of the
statute. In addition, this Court should adopt the substantial compliance test of other jurisdictions
4

that would allow the Court to focus on the actions of the Plaintiff and any resulting prejudice to
the state rather than technical outcome of the service of notice of claim. The decision of the trial
Court should be reversed and Mr. Crofts should be allowed to proceed with his claim as his
actions show he substantially complied with all statutory requirements.
ARGUMENT

I.

TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED MR. CROFTS'
CLAIM UNDER THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.

This case presents the perfect facts for this Court to evaluate the meaning of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act ("UGIA") and Utah precedent on the same law. (Attached in
Addendum). The dismissal of Mr. Crofts' claim is not a necessary or just result under Utah law. The
trial judge felt he was obligated under the UGIA to dismiss Mr. Crofts' claim (R. 82 Iranscript pg 1011). However, both Utah precedent and exemplary law from other jurisdictions show that fairness
and justice do not have to be sacrificed in the name of strict compliance to the statute.
Mr. Crofts' claim was served one day beyond the one-year deadline given in the UGIA for
claims against the government. (R. 33 Constable's proof of service). The reason for this delay was
the fault of the Constable charged with service on Saint George not the Plaintiff or his Attorney. (R.
29 Affidavit of Rob Kolkman). While strict compliance mandates dismissal even in this situation,
Utah precedent has allowed for something less than strict compliance where the resulting dismissal is
not reflective of the purpose of the UGIA.
Utah case law has allowed for something less than strict compliance in specific situations
where the facts are limiting and the application clearly within the intent of the statute. See
Moreno v. Board of Educ, 926 P.2d 886, 887 (Utah 1996). In the same way, other jurisdictions
5

have allowed for substantial compliance with statutory requirements when the Plaintiffs conduct
warrants such equitable exceptions. See, Lesko v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. App. 3d 476, 484
(Cal. App. IstDist. 1982).
Saint George City was made fully aware of all litigants and facts in the Notice of Claim,
and the delay in service was not caused by the Plaintiff, in short the UGIA is being used by the
City of Saint George to evade an action by an injured complainant. (R.82 transcript pg 8). Strict
compliance of the UGIA is used to protect the government against needless law suits not as a
wall that they may hide behind to dodge legitimate Plaintiffs.
a. Mr. Crofts has shown good cause as to why his complaint was filed one day late
and therefore the Court should allow his action to proceed based on equitable
theories.
Under the UGIA Mr. Crofts was required to file a Notice of Claim with Saint George City
within one year of the date of his injuries. "Plaintiffs must exercise the diligence necessary to
effect strict compliance with the Immunity Act." Davis v. Cent. Utah Counseling Ctr., 2006 UT
52, ^[42 (Utah 2006). Subsequent to his injuries Mr. Crofts placed himself under the qualified
care of a physician. Mr. Crofts did not intend to file suit unless he had permanent injuries and
knew that his physical impairment would not improve. On March 10, 2006, 17 days before the
deadline, Mr. Crofts's counsel delivered the Notice of Claim to the Constable in Salt Lake City.
(R. 26 letter to Constable Exhibit A of Motion to Enlarge Time). The Constable assured
Plaintiffs counsel that the Notice of Claim would be delivered before the March 27th deadline.
(R. 29 and 33 Affidavit of Rob Kolkman, pg 3 of Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss).
Plaintiffs counsel chose personal service because it is the most reliable method of service
6

with a traceable delivery. Establishing proof of service, as required by U.C.A. §68-3-8.5, if a
question of receipt arises can be difficult if not impossible. Specifically, in this case, if there had
been a problem with mail delivery Plaintiff may not have had time to correct the problem before
the statutory deadline.
It is important to note that "the rule requiring 'strict compliance' with the notice
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act does not come from the language of the act
itself. Great West Cas. Co. v. DOT, 2001 UT App 54, fl5 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) quoting, Utah
Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to 38 (1997 and Supp. 2000). The "strict compliance" standard was first
applied to the UGIA by the Utah Supreme Court in Scarborough v. Granite School District. 531
P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1975). In the Moreno case the shift made by the Utah Supreme Court
"from a blanket 'strict compliance' standard for notices of claim to more of a 'substantial
compliance' standard, at least in certain situations, is fully consistent with the more charitable
view taken in many other jurisdictions, which require only substantial compliance with the notice
requirements of the state's governmental immunity statute." Great West Cas. Co., at f 15 citing,
Moreno v. Board of E d u c 926 P.2d 886, 887 (Utah 1996).
For example, a California Court shaped a test to use for substantial compliance. "[I]n
our view, the concept of "reasonable diligence" relates to an inability to effect service within the
statutory time." Lesko v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. App. 3d 476, 484-485 (Cal. App. 1st Dist.
1982). This case falls exactly into that category. Despite Mr. Crofts' best reasonable efforts he
was unable to effect service within the one year deadline required by the UGIA. Under these
circumstances a two-fold test can be used: "First, did the Plaintiff exercise "reasonable
diligence?" Second, if he did, the trial Court in exercising its discretion as to whether to dismiss,
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must balance "the harm to the Plaintiff if the motion is granted against the prejudice to the
Defendant if he is forced to defend the suit." Id. at 484. Did Mr. Crofts exercise reasonable
diligence? Yes. His attorney delivered the Notice of Claim well before the deadline to the
Constable, and then checked to make sure it would be delivered on time. The trial Court
specifically stated: "Well, counsel, I wish I could adopt your position. Frankly, I feel bad that
Mr. Crofts has come out of this because of the unexplainable action of the magistrate to get this
served." (R. 82 pg 10-11 transcript). The evidence clearly shows that the delay in service was
not due to any fault of the Plaintiff.
In addition, the one day delay of the Notice of Claim did not prejudice the City of Saint
George, in anyway. The trial Court also stated: "So we are just on the cusp here. It's so minute
there is no prejudice allowed." (R. 82 transcript pg 8). Furthermore, the delay did not cause
prejudice because the city had knowledge of the claim before the notice was served. (R. 82
transcript pg 8). This case, under Utah law which complies with the current law of other
jurisdictions, should not be dismissed because of lack of compliance with the UGIA.
b. more than reasonable diligence is required by the UGIA.
Utah Courts have been quick to state that the very nature of the Government allowing suit
against itself requires strict compliance with the statute because the Government created the right
to sue in the first place. "However, the Utah Supreme Court in Moreno did loosen the standard
for evaluating the adequacy of notices of claim to something less than "strict compliance" in
certain situations." Great West Cas. Co. v. DOT, 2001 UT App 54, flO (Utah Ct. App. 2001).
This exception was made because the Court saw a situation where absolute strict compliance was
not supporting the interests of justice or the intent of the statute. Moreno holds that so long as
8

the Plaintiff had standing to bring the suit a third party entitled to all or a portion of the same
claim "may piggyback on the filing party's notice of claim and maintain an independent suit
against the State." Id. at TJ15. This exception made by the Moreno Court applies "even if the
notice of claim does not name the third party as a claimant, and thus is not in strict compliance
with the statute." Id. Likewise, this case should not be dismissed because Mr. Crofts did
everything necessary to comply with the statute and the Notice of Claim was delivered one day
late beyond the control of the Plaintiff.
The facts make it clear that the Plaintiff did everything reasonably necessary to effect
strict compliance with the UGIA. "Strict compliance is not, however, a one-way street, and a
claimant is not required to do more than the Act clearly requires." Peeples v. State, 2004 UT
App 328, ^9 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). The dismissal of Mr. Crofts' claim is punishing him not only
for waiting to filing suit until he was sure his injuries were permanent and serious, but also the
mistakes of others. The UGIA does not require Mr. Crofts to do anything more than he did, i.e.
take all necessary steps to effect on time delivery of the Notice of Claim.
"The effect of Moreno is, in essence, to supplant the strict compliance standard with a
standard of pretty strict compliance in cases of multiple claimants with standing to sue on the
same claim." Great West Cas. Co., at f 15 (quotations omitted). Like the Moreno case, this case
presents a factual situation where substantial compliance can be used in a very specific case.
Concisely, when the Plaintiff has done everything they can to meet the requirements of the
statute and any lack of compliance is beyond the control of the Plaintiff the Court should use the
Moreno standard of substantial compliance. The facts of this case are clear, and under the UGIA
the trial Court's decision should be reversed.
9

c. Dismissal of Mr. Crofts' action allows the City of Saint George to avoid
responsibility despite the fact that Mr. Crofts substantially complied with every
requirement of the UGIA.
Mr. Crofts served upon the Saint George City a completed Notice of Claim that detailed
injuries he sustained on city property. The validity of that claim or the underlying injury is not in
dispute here. Mr. Crofts has been denied the opportunity to litigate those issues because of the
mistakes of an outside party, and an unnecessary rule of strict compliance with the UGIA. "The
Governmental Immunity Act serves two important purposes. First, it affords the responsible
public authorities an opportunity to investigate, settle, or deny a claim without expending public
revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation. Also, compliance with the Governmental
Immunity Act provides an opportunity to those vested with authority to remedy a dangerous
condition so that further damage or injury can be avoided." Busch v. Salt Lake Int'l Airport, 921
P.2d 470, 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Both of these purposes have been served with Mr. Crofts'
Notice of Claim and compliance with the UGIA. The fact that the Notice of Claim was delivered
one day late by the Constable, without the knowledge of the Plaintiff, does not hurt or hinder the
state's investigation or settlement opportunities in any way.
"One of the cardinal principles of statutory construction is that the Courts will look to the
reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire context and subject matter of
the statute dealing with the subject." Longley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., 2000 UT 69, fl9 (Utah
2000)(quotations omitted). The facts of this case are a perfect example of how the Courts must
look at the sense of the legislation. The UGIA requires a Plaintiff to file a notice of claim within
a year of injury to avoid unnecessary legislation wasting government resources. The Notice of
Claim in this case was delivered one day, only twenty-four hours, beyond the deadline at no fault
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of the Plaintiff. The circumstances are not what the UGIA intended to prevent, and Mr. Crofts is
unjustly being denied his right to sue. Both Utah case law and the Lesko case from California
illustrate examples of rules and tests that can be adopted by this Court so that future litigants are
not denied their access to Courts in suits against the government when they have substantially
complied with all statutory requirements.
It is well known, and the Plaintiff admits, that "the strict compliance standard favors the
State, and its application often results in the barring of claims." Peeples v. State, 2004 UT App
328, ^}9 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). However, in cases such as this where the Plaintiff has clearly
strictly complied with the UGIA, and another person is the source of the mistake, this Court must
use the substantially compliant standard.
II.

A NARROW EXCEPTION TO THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT WILL BOTH MAINTAIN STRICT COMPLIANCE
AND ALLOW FOR JUSTICE.

The standard of "strict compliance" is not stated in this UGIA. Therefore it is within the
discretion of this Court to follow Utah precedent and that of other jurisdictions in order to create
a narrow exception for substantial compliance. In essence the exception need only be applied
when the Plaintiff has fully complied with all the requirements of the UGIA. "[T]he critical
question is whether a Plaintiff used reasonable diligence in prosecuting his or her case. The
particular factual context or cause of the noncompliance should not be determinative, rather, the
primary concern must be the nature of the Plaintiffs conduct." Lesko v. Superior Court, 127 Cal.
App. 3d 476, 483 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1982). Focusing on the Plaintiffs conduct insures that
purposes of the legislation will not be lost.
One Utah case sums up the requirements of the UGIA very well. This Court stated: "All
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that is required is simple compliance, and there is no need for a claimant to exceed the Act's
requirements even if such action might more optimally accomplish the purposes underlying the
Act." Peeples v. State, 2004 UT App 328, f 9 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). Adhering to a rule of
absolute compliance no matter what the efforts of the Plaintiff is requiring a claimant to exceed
the requirements of the UGIA. This Court has already stated in dicta the reasoning for adopting a
rule a substantial compliance in limited areas.
[I]f a technically deficient notice of claim nonetheless does what such a notice is designed to do
and provides the State with enough information to become aware of the incident, conduct an
investigation, and make an informed decision about its liability, the State should not be so quick
to hide behind the cloak of "sovereign immunity." That doctrine arose when the monarch was
rather antagonistic to his subjects and wished to insulate the treasury from the just claims of the
peasantry, who were expected to embrace the fiction that "the King can do no wrong." We know
better now, and in modern America, where the state enjoys a much more benevolent relationship
with its citizens and has a more realistic view of its own fallibility, the enlightened sovereign
should be willing to accept responsibility for its negligence when the deficiencies in a notice of
claim do not actually prejudice its ability to investigate a claim, evaluate its merit, and resolve it
in timely fashion.
Great West Cas. Co. v. DOT, 2001 UT App 54, f 18 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). The City of Saint
George should not be allowed to hide behind the UGIA. The Plaintiff exercised reasonable care,
and due diligence, to effect the timely delivery of the Notice of Claim, and although it was
delivered one day late, no harm came of the delay to the city attorney. Allowing for a narrow
exception in this case will not mitigate the purposes of the UGIA, but will promulgate justice in
cases brought against the State.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Appellant respectfully asks this Court to reverse the decision
12

of the trial Court and allow the Plaintiff to proceed with his claim
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

2$.day of October, 2008.
^en"B. Wall
'
' "
dtorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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21'Say of October, 2008, to the following:

Michael W. Hoimer
Jesse C. Trentadue
SUTTER AXLAND
8 East Broadway, Suite 200
2nd Floor
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APPENDIX
1. Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103
2. Utah Code Ann. §63-30d- 401
3. Utah Code Ann. §63-30d-402

JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
|'ew those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under
jcfcion(3)(b).
|(g) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements
ffitle 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its
|iew of agency adjudicative proceedings.
2008
JA-3-103. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, j u d g e s pro
tempore, and practice of law.
) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and
|ence for use in the courts of the state and shall by rule
iage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend
[erules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme
t upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses
|fhe Legislature.
1 Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution,
ieSupreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and
jes and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties.
is pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States,
h residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah.
) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of
[L including admission to practice law and the conduct and
jscipiine of persons admitted to the practice of law.
2008
IpA-3-104. Appellate court administrator.
• The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and
Import staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme
and the Court of Appeals. The duties of the clerks and
jipport staff shall be established by the appellate court
mdiDinistrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme
Pftirt.

2008

[jHA-3-105. S e r v i c e of sheriff to court.
I'The court may at any time require the attendance and
Irvices of any sheriff in the state.
2008

CHAPTER 4
COURT OF APPEALS
iSection
J8A-4-101.
pA-4-102.
fm-4-103.
L-4-104.
:f8A4-105.
-4-106.

Creation — Seal.
Number of judges — Terms — Functions —
Filing fees.
Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
Location of Court of Appeals.
Review of actions by Supreme Court.
Appellate Mediation Office — Protected
records and information — Governmental
immunity.

?8A-4-101. Creation — S e a l .
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal.
2008

"8A-4-102. N u m b e r of j u d g e s — Terms — F u n c t i o n s —
Filing fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is
until the first general election held more than three years
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the
ierm of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or
fraction thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The

78A-4-103

Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a
chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from among the members of the court by majority
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than two
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity
of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of
Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of
Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court
and the Judicial Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for
the Supreme Court.
2008
78A-4-103. Court of A p p e a l s jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agencv action under Section
63G-3-602;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first
degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a conviction or charge of a first
degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first
degree or capital felony:
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first
degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parenttime, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the
Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme
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Court for original appellate review and determination any
m a t t e r over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act,
in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
2008

Section
78A-5-111.

78A-4-104. L o c a t i o n of Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals h a s its principal location in Salt Lake
City. The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in
any location within the state.
2008

78A-5-201.

78A-4-105. R e v i e w of a c t i o n s b y S u p r e m e Court.
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court.
2008
78A-4-106. A p p e l l a t e M e d i a t i o n Office — P r o t e c t e d
r e c o r d s a n d i n f o r m a t i o n — G o v e r n m e n t a l immunity.
(1) Unless a more restrictive rule of court is adopted pursuant to Subsection 63G-2-201(3)(b), information and records
relating to any matter on appeal received or generated by the
Chief Appellate Mediator or other staff of the Appellate
Mediation Office as a result of any party's participation or lack
of participation in the settlement program shall be maintained as protected records pursuant to Subsections 63G-2305(16), (17), (18), and (33).
(2) In addition to the access restrictions on protected
records provided in Section 63G-2-202, the information and
records may not be disclosed to judges, staff, or employees of
any court of this state.
(3) The Chief Appellate Mediator may disclose statistical
and other demographic information as may be necessary and
useful to report on the status and to allow supervision and
oversight of the Appellate Mediation Office.
(4) When acting as mediators, the Chief Appellate Mediator
and other professional staff of the Appellate Mediation Office
shall be immune from liability p u r s u a n t to Title 63G, Chapter
7, Governmental Immunity Act of Utah.
(5) P u r s u a n t to Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4,
the Supreme Court may exercise overall supervision of the
Appellate Mediation Office as part of the appellate process.
2008

CHAPTER 5
DISTRICT COURT
Part 1
General P r o v i s i o n s
Section
78A-5-101.
78A-5-102.

78A-5-103.
78A-5-104.
78A-5-105.
78A-5-106.

78A-5-107.
78A-5-108.
78A-5-109.
78A-5-110.

State District Court Administrative System.
Jurisdiction — Appeals [Effective until J a n u ary 1, 2009].
Jurisdiction — Appeals [Effective J a n u a r y 1.
2009].
District court case management.
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly.
Term of judges — Vacancy.
Presiding judge —Associate presiding judge —
Election — Term — Compensation — Powers
— Duties.
Court commissioners — Qualifications — Appointment — Functions governed by rule.
Duties of the clerk of the district court.
Costs of system.
Allocation of district court fees and forfeitures.
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Transfer of court operating responsibiliS
Facilities — Staff— Budget.
Part 2
D r u g Court

78A-5-202.

Creation and expansion of existing drugi
programs — Definition of drug cduAjj
gram — Criteria for participation M| r
court programs — Reporting requiren
Creation of Drug Board Pilot Project ^4j
nition of Drug Board Pilot Project for parolee participation in the Drug!!
Pilot Project — Reporting req[uirementsl
PARTI
GENERAL PROVISIONS

78A-5-101. State District Court Administrative;
tern.
(1) The district court is a trial court of general jurisdicslfl
(2) There is established a State District Court Adminis|
tive System. The Judicial Council shall admirdster thetof|
ation of the system.
(3) In this chapter, "court system" means the State'JJisJai
?s
Court Administrative System.
(4) A district court shall be located in the countpsia|
each county.
78A-5-102. J u r i s d i c t i o n — A p p e a l s [Effective)
J a n u a r y 1, 2009].
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all ml
civil and criminal, not excepted in the U t a h Constitution!!!
not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraon
writs and other writs necessary to carry into effect
orders, judgments, and decrees.
(3) The district court h a s jurisdiction over matters of$
yer discipline consistent with t h e rules of the Supreme Col
(4) The district court h a s jurisdiction over all mai
properly filed in the circuit court prior to July 1, 1996. s
(5) The district court h a s appellate jurisdiction over juj
ments and orders of the justice court as outlined in Sei
78A-7-118 and small claims appeals filed pursuant to Seel
78A-8-106.
(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees
the district court are under Sections 78A-3-102 and 78A^
103.
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review:
(a) agency adjudicative proceedings as set forthinTii
63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, and
comply with the requirements of t h a t chapter, in-stjij
review of agency adjudicative proceedings; and
(b) municipal administrative proceedings in jaccogg
dance with Section 10-3-703.7.
r-&|
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district courfcqhl
subject matter jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors,
misdemeanors, infractions, and violations of ordinani
if:
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdit
(b) the offense occurred within the boundaries lofj
municipality in which the district courthouse i s i
and that municipality h a s not formed a justice coi
(c) they are included in an indictment or informl
covering a single criminal episode alleging the com
sion of a felony or a class A misdemeanor.
(9) If the district court h a s subject matter jurisdit
p u r s u a n t to Subsection (5) or (8), it also h a s jurisdictioi
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ies or a cost-benefit analysis of the use of
concrete barriers. Johnson v. Utah DOT, 2006
UT 15, 133 R3d 402.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Law and Family Studies. —
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales and the Awful
Truth: Utah's Mandatory Enforcement Laws

Make Police Enforcement of a Victim's Protective Order Optional, 8 J.L. Fam. Stud. 405
(2006).

PART 4
NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST A GOVERNMENTAL
ENTITY OR A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE
63-30d-401. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents —
Service — Legal disability — Appointment of
g u a r d i a n ad litem.
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), a claim arises when the
statute of limitations that would apply if the claim were against a private
person begins to run.
(b) The statute of limitations does not begin to run until a claimant
knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known:
(i) that the claimant had a claim against the governmental entity
or its employee; and
(ii) the identity of the governmental entity or the name of the
employee.
(c) The burden to prove the exercise of reasonable diligence is upon the
claimant.
(2) Any person having a claim against a governmental entity, or against its
employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of the
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority
shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action,
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted;
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known;
and
(iv) if the claim is being pursued against a governmental employee
individually as provided in Subsection 63-30d-202(3)(c), the name of
the employee.
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent,
attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and
(ii) directed and delivered by hand or by mail according to the
requirements of Section 68-3-8.5 to the office of:
(A) the city or town clerk, when the claim is against an
incorporated city or town;
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county;
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board,
when the claim is against a school district or board of education;
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(D) the presiding officer or secretary/clerk of the board, when
the claim is against a local district or special service district;
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of
Utah;
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or
executive secretary, when the claim is against any other public
board, commission, or body; or
(G) the agent authorized by a governmental entity to receive
the notice of claim by the governmental entity under Subsection
(5)(e).
(4) (a) If an injury that may reasonably be expected to result in a claim
against a governmental entity is sustained by a claimant who is under the
age of majority or mentally incompetent, that governmental entity may
file a request with the court for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for
the potential claimant.
(b) If a guardian ad litem is appointed, the time for filing a claim under
Section 63-30d-402 begins when the order appointing the guardian is
issued.
(5) (a) Each governmental entity subject to suit under this chapter shall file
a statement with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code
within the Department of Commerce containing:
(i) the name and address of the governmental entity;
(ii) the office or agent designated to receive a notice of claim; and
(iii) the address at which it is to be directed and delivered.
(b) Each governmental entity shall update its statement as necessary to
ensure that the information is accurate.
(c) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall develop a
form for governmental entities to complete that provides the information
required by Subsection (5)(a).
(d) (i) Newly incorporated municipalities shall file the statement required by Subsection (5)(a) at the time t h a t the statement of incorporation and boundaries is filed with the lieutenant governor under
- Section 10-1-106.
(ii) Newly incorporated local districts shall file the statement
required by Subsection (5)(a) at the time that the written notice is
filed with the lieutenant governor under Section 17B-1-215.
(e) A governmental entity may, in its statement, identify an agent
authorized by the entity to accept notices of claim on its behalf.
(6) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall:
(a) maintain an index of the statements required by this section
arranged both alphabetically by entity and by county of operation; and
(b) make the indices available to the public both electronically and via
hard copy.
(7) A governmental entity may not challenge the validity of a notice of claim
on the grounds that it was not directed and delivered to the proper office or
agent if the error is caused by the governmental entity's failure to file or update
the statement required by Subsection (5).
History: C. 1953, 63-30d-401, enacted by
L. 2004, ch. 267, § 15; 2007, ch. 329, § 432.
Amendment Notes. — The 2007 amendment, effective April 30, 2007, substituted "local district or special service district" for "special district" in Subsection (3)(b)(ii)(D) and, in

Subsection (5Xd)(ii), substituted "local" for
"special" and "lieutenant governor under Section 17B-1-215" for "State Tax Commission, and
State Auditor under Sections 17A-1-102 and
17B-3-215" and deleted "of creation of the district" after "written notice."

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT OF UTAH
notice of claim, 76 A.L.R.3d 1244.
Local government tort liability: minority as
affecting notice of claim requirement, 58
A.L.R.4th 402.
Insufficiency of notice of claim against municipality as regards statement of place where
accident occurred, 69 A.L.R.4th 484.
Complaint as satisfying requirement of notice of claim upon states, municipalities, and
other political subdivisions, 45 A.L.R.5th 109.
Persons or entities upon whom notice of injury or claim against state or state agencies

63-30d-402

may or must be served, 45 A.L.R.5th 173.
Sufficiency of notice of claim against local
government unit as regards identity, name,
address, and residence of claimant, 53
A.L.R.5th 617.
Sufficiency of notice of claim against local
political entity as regards time when accident
occurred, 57 A.L.R.5th 689.
Waiver of, or estoppel to assert, failure to give
or defects in notice of claim against state or
local political subdivision — modern status, 64
A.L.R.5th 519.

63-30d-402. Time for filing notice of claim.
A claim against a governmental entity, or against an employee for an act or
omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the
scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of
claim is filed with the person and according to the requirements of Section
63-30d-401 within one year after the claim arises regardless of whether or not
the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
History: C. 1953, 63-30d-402, e n a c t e d b y
L. 2004, ch. 267, § 16.
Effective Dates. — Laws 2004, ch. 267, § 49
makes the act effective on July 1, 2004.

Cross-References. — Health Care Malpractice Act, § 78-14-1 et seq.
Mailing claims to state or political
subdivisions, § 63-37-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
A m e n d m e n t s to complaint.
In malpractice action where university physician was granted immunity upon entry of
summary
judgment,
patient's
proposed
amendment to complaint which set forth claims
against the university that arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in
the original pleading related back under Utah
R. Civ. P. 15(c) and was not untimely, even
though more than a year had passed since the
original complaint was filed, where no scheduling order had been entered, no trial date had
been set, no expert discovery had taken place,
and discovery was still ongoing. Nunez v. Albo,
2002 UT App 247, 53 R3d 2, cert, denied, 59
P.3d 603.

ANALYSIS

Administrative proceedings.
Amendments to complaint.
Cause of action.
Claims barred.
Claims by minors.
Claims for death.
Compliance with requirements.
Contract action.
Estoppel.
Exemptions.
—Equitable claims.
Federal claim.
Necessity for presentation of claim.
Notice.
Quiet title actions.
Recovery of real property.
Remedy for wrongful act.
Administrative p r o c e e d i n g s .
Tenured teacher seeking reinstatement
following decision to terminate his services had
no claim for breach of contract until after adverse result at administrative hearing provided
for by the school termination provisions (now
§ 53A-8-101 et seq.); therefore, where he filed
his notice of claim within the statutory period
after termination of the hearing, he complied
with the relevant requirements. P r a t t v. Board
of Educ, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977) (decided
under prior law).

Cause of action.
A cause of action against the state accrues at
the time of the subject accident rather than
when a plaintiff satisfies the threshold
requirements under § 31A-22-309. Jepson v.
State, 846 P.2d 485 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Claims barred.
Neither actual knowledge by county officials
of circumstances which resulted in death of
four-year-old child's mother in an automobile
accident nor minority of the child dispensed
with necessity of filing timely claim in action
against county in which it was alleged that
death was due to inadequate warning signs and
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